Can We Indict a Sitting President? by Bloch, Susan Low
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1997 
Can We Indict a Sitting President? 
Susan Low Bloch 
Georgetown University Law Center, bloch@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1560 
 
Susan Low Bloch, Can We Indict a Sitting President?, foreword to Ought A President of the 
United States Be Prosecuted, 2 Nexus 7 (1997). 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the President/Executive Department Commons 
Foreword
Susan Low Bloch *
This symposium addresses the
difficult question of whether a President can
be criminally prosecuted while still in office
or whether indictment and prosecution must
await his leaving. The question is difficult
because the text of the Constitution gives us
some hints but no dispositive answers. At
first reading, Section 3 of Article I seems to
suggest that impeachment must precede any
criminal prosecution: "Judgment in Cases
of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust,
or Profit under the United States; but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment
and Punishment, according to Law." Thus,
the provision suggests it may be prescribing
a temporal order - impeachment and then
prosecution. However, closer analysis
reveals that the provision may simply be
defining and limiting the effects of
impeachment and making clear that other
punishments can be still imposed by the
criminal process without violating any
prohibitions against doublejeopardy; it may
not be addressing the issue of order at all.
In attempting to answer this thorny
question, the articles in this symposium run
the full gamut. On one side of the debate is
the conclusion offered by Professor Akhil
Amar and Brian Kalt, who argue that the
President is unique and cannot be subject to
prosecution by state or federal systems while
in office. He must first be removed either by
impeachment, the voters, or the expiration
of his term. They infer this temporary
immunity from Article H1 and the separation-
of-powers of the Constitution.
Professor Jay Bybee also concludes
that impeachment must precede criminal
indictment and prosecution, but he goes
farther than Amar and Kalt in applying that
rule not only to the President but to all federal
officers subject to impeachment, i.e., the Vice
President, federal judges, and all civil officers
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of the United States. In his view, both the
text of the Constitution and policy
considerations dictate this conclusion.
However, Professor Bybee treats civil
actions against Presidents differently; in
particular, he concludes that sitting Presidents
have no temporary immunity from civil
actions.
Professor Scott Howe presents a
slightly different view. In his opinion, the
Constitution cannot be read to provide a
sitting President any temporary immunity
from prosecution. However, he believes that
policy arguments favor such an immunity as
a matter of federal common law. While
Professor Howe's analysis is similar to that
of Professor Amar and Brian Kalt, Howe's
conclusion that the immunity is not
constitutionally required can have important
implications. If immunity is only a matter of
federal common law, as Professor Howe
suggests, then Congress can change it at any
time. Congress can restrict its scope,
eliminate the immunity entirely, or expand its
usage. If, on the other hand, the Constitution
provides the immunity, as Amar and Kalt,
and Bybee believe, Congress cannot
eliminate it.
Professor Howe goes on to examine
how far the immunity extends. He concludes
that it should apply as well to the Vice
President, but not to the President's spouse.
He also suggests that temporary immunity
should apply to civil as well as criminal cases.
Thus, he agrees with the position being
advocated by President Clinton's lawyers in
the Supreme Court in the Clinton v. Jones
case. The one distinction between Professor
Howe's position and that being argued by
the President's lawyers is that Howe believes
this immunity is a matter only of federal
common law; the President's lawyers argue
the immunity is to be inferred from the
Constitution.
On the other extreme is the view of
Professor Eric Freedman: sitting Presidents
are not immune from criminal prosecution.
Analyzing the constitutional text, the Framers'
debates, historical precedent with respect to
other federal officials, as well as policy
arguments, Professor Freedman finds no
support for such immunity; moreover, he
sees no need to infer it. While he does not
explicitly discuss the question of immunity
for civil actions, I suspect his analysis would
also lead him to conclude that there shall not
be any immunity from civil actions.
Terry Eastland offers an interesting
perspective on Professor Freedman's theme.
He agrees there is no constitutional immunity
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from criminal prosecution for a sitting
President. Nor does he believe that any
immunity should be found in federal common
law. But he suggests that whether or not a
prosecution goes forward is entirely in the
control of the President. Because the
President has the responsibility under Article
II, Section 3, to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed, and has the power under
Article II, Section 2, to pardon, including, in
Eastland's view, the power to pardon himself
the President can control whether or not he
is indicted, prosecuted, and sentenced. The
only check on the President's use of these
powers is a political check by the people
and Congress' power to impeach. Thus, if
the President wants either to order the
suspension of a prosecution or to pardon
himself, and is willing to take the political
consequences, nothing in the Constitution
precludes his doing that.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
addresses a somewhat different question and
concludes that there should be no temporary
immunity for civil actions against a sitting
President for conduct unrelated to the
presidency. Thus, in his view, civil suits
against the President for unofficial acts can
proceed while the President is still in office.
In particular, he believes that Paula Jones'
sexual harassment suit against President
Clinton for conduct allegedly occurring prior
to his presidency can proceed immediately.'
Professor Chemerinsky does not indicate
whether he believes there is also no
temporary immunity for criminal actions but
much of his reasoning suggests that he is likely
to agree with Terry Eastland and Professor
Eric Freedman.
As these articles indicate, the
questions raised by the prospect of suing a
sitting President are not easy to resolve. And
while it would be good if we never had to
answer them, history indicates they cannot
be avoided. The Supreme Court will give
us some answers in the Jones case now
pending before it; while that case addresses
only the question of civil actions against a
sitting President, the Court's analysis may
give us at least some guidance on the issue
of criminal prosecutions as well.
In the course of his discussion, Professor
Chemerinsky wonders whether those law
professors who filed an amicus curiae brief
in Clinton v. Jones arguing for temporary
immunity would be taking the same position
if Paula Jones were suing a Republican
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President. As one of the authors of the amicus
brief, I would respond personally that the
answer is "Yes." Obviously, the argument
has nothing to do with the identity or party
affiliation of the incumbent; the question is
what the Office of the Presidency requires.
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